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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Appellant Salt Lake County [hereinafter, "the County"] timely filed its Notice of 
Appeal herein in Third District Court on March 15, 2001 from an Order dated February 26, 
2001 granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee Metro West Ready Mix, Inc. 
[hereinafter, "Metro West"]. 
Jurisdiction in this matter is proper in the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. Sec. 78-2-2(4), Sec. 78-2a-3(2)(j), and the Order of the Utah Supreme Court 
dated July 16, 2001 transferring this case to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in granting a summary judgment in favor of 
Metro West [see Add. "A"] which determined as a matter of law that "[defendants are the 
rightful owners of Parcel G... ." More specifically: (a) did the trial court misconstrue or 
misapply Utah's "Recording Act" (UTAH CODE ANN. Sec. 57-3-101, et seq.) by erroneously 
vesting title to the subject real property in Metro West based upon the Recording Act, and 
(b) did the trial court fail to recognize genuine issues of material fact surrounding Metro 
West's purported title to Parcel G, and Metro West's status as a subsequent good faith 
purchaser under the Recording Act, which should have precluded summary judgment? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are 
no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. Utah appellate courts review a trial courts' summary judgment ruling for correctness 
and without deference to the trial court's legal determinations, Rawsonv. Conover, 2001 UT 
24,125, 20 P.3d 876; Sur. Underwriters v. E & C Trucking, 2000 UT 71115, 10 P.3d 338, 
340 (Utah 2000), and view the facts and all reasonable inferences arising from those facts 
in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Utah R. Civ. P. 56 (c). See also Higgins 
v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 253 (Utah 1993); Baldwin v. Burton. 850 P.2d 1188, 
1192 (Utah 1993), and Julian v. Peterson, 966 P.2d 878, 879 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE BY APPELLANT: The County preserved the 
foregoing issue for appeal by: (a) on October 13,2000, filing its memorandum in opposition 
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to the Appellee's motion for summary judgment, filed on or about September 11, 2000 [R. 
165,169-181]; and (b) appearing at oral argument on January 2,2001 before Third District 
Court Judge Sandra Peuler in opposition to Appellee's motion for summary judgment.. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
STATUTES 
UTAH CODE ANN. Sections 57-3-101; 57-3-102(1); 57-3-103 (Recording Act) [Add. "B"]. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
1. Nature of the Case: This case concerns a quiet title action commenced by the 
County in Third District Court regarding a parcel of land (referred to in the trial court record 
as "Parcel G") adjacent to the adjoining Salt Lake County and Utah County boundary lines 
near Interstate 15 (the "point of the mountain"). The County's action sought to quiet title to 
Parcel G in the County. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment seeking title to 
Parcel G on three grounds: (a) Utah's Recording Act; (b) a claim by adverse possession; and 
(c) "equity and sound public policy"[R.80, 82, 94-94], which was granted by the trial court. 
2. Course of Proceedings: 
A. Civil action filed in Third District Court by County (Appellant) on or about 
February 10, 1999. 
B. Defendant/Appellee's (Metro West's) motion for summary judgment filed on 
or about September 11, 2000. 
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C. Plaintiff/Appellant's (County's) memorandum in opposition to Metro West's 
motion for summary judgment filed October 13, 2000. 
D. Defendant/Appellee's (Metro West's) reply memorandum in support of motion 
for summary judgment filed on or about November 9, 2000. 
E. Oral argument heard on Defendant/Appellee's (Metro West's) motion for 
summary judgment by Honorable Sandra N. Peuler January 2, 2001. 
F. Minute Entry by Honorable Sandra N. Peuler granting Defendant/Appellee's 
(Metro West's) motion for summary judgment entered February 6, 2001. 
G. Order by Honorable Sandra N. Peuler granting Defendant/Appellee's (Metro 
West's) motion for summary judgment February 26, 2001. 
H. The County's Notice of Appeal filed in Third District Court on March 15, 
2001 from Order dated February 26, 2001. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. "Parcel G" is a parcel of about 15 acres, and part of a larger parcel known as 
"Government Lot 4," located adjacent1 to the Utah County-Salt Lake County 
boundary near the "point of the mountain." 
2. The original land transfers affecting Parcel G relevant in this case occurred in 
the late 1800's, many years before the boundary line between Salt Lake County 
*In fact, the northern boundary of Parcel is the Utah County/Salt Lake County 
boundary line. [R. 81,83] 
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and Utah County was established with linear measurements by a metes and 
bounds survey map. A County Agreement which established the precise 
boundary line by such a survey map was executed by officials of both counties 
on February 21,1910. [R. 196]. Prior to that survey and boundary-agreement, 
the east-west boundary line between the two counties was only defined 
topographically by Utah Territorial Compiled Laws (1876), which defined 
Utah County as "bounded ... north by the summit of the cross range between 
the Oquirrh and Wasatch Mountains ...." [R. 275-77]. 
On August 6, 1878, The United States government conveyed all of 
Government Lot 4 (including Parcel G) by a land patent to William Turner, 
who recorded his patent in Salt Lake County on September 23,1878 (Book N 
Page 175) [R. 195]. 
William Turner then conveyed Parcel G to Plaintiff/Appellant Salt Lake 
County ("the County") by warranty deed dated December 4,1878. Salt Lake 
County paid $1,000 for the property. As the precise county boundary line was 
not yet established by a metes and bounds description, the County's deed was 
recorded with the Salt Lake County recorder on December 21,1878 (Book N 
Page 480-481) [R. 195]. The County also recorded its deed from William 
Turner with the federal Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") at about the 
same time. [R. 198,19]. 
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5. The County's 1878 acquisition of Parcel G {i.e., its Warranty Deed from 
William Turner) was recorded with the Utah County recorder on June 17, 
1998. 
6. Defendant Lamona Farms, a Utah general partnership, acting through its 
principals Paul Richards and his since deceased business partner, David 
Nelson, purportedly acquired its interest in Parcel G from Dahrl and Roena 
Tingey (the "Tingeys") by quit-claim deed, dated April 14, 1989. [R. 127]. 
7. Defendant/Appellee Metro West Ready Mix, Inc. ("Metro West") received a 
Warranty Deed to parcel G from Lamona Farms on April 14, 1991.2 Paul 
Richards acted in these transactions as a principal of both Metro West and 
Lamona Farms. 
8. There is no evidence in the official Utah County record of chain of title to 
Parcel G showing that the Tingeys ever acquired a valid interest in the parcel 
prior to their conveyance to Lamona Farms. [R. 197-198, ff 7, 10]. Lamona 
Farms, via Paul Richards, accepted the Tingeys' quit claim deed without 
2The conveyance from Lamona Farms was nominally made to "Monterra Rock 
Products, Inc.," which is also a Defendant in this case. However, according to 
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgement, Monterra 
Rock merged into Metro West in 1993, with the surviving corporation being known as 
"Metro West Ready Mix, Inc." [R. 84, f 4]. Thus, for purposes of this appeal, the 
successor-in-interest to Lamona Farms is referred to simply as "Metro West." 
Additionally, Metro West and its predecessor, Lamona Farms, are often collectively 
referred to herein as "Metro West" because of the identity of their claimed interest in 
Parcel G. 
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securing legal advice [R. 215,11. 13-16], title insurance, a professional title 
examination and report [R. 217-220,11.12-10], or documentary evidence of a 
prior conveyance of Parcel G to the Tingeys [id.]. 
SUMMARY OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT 
First, the trial court misapplied Utah's recording statute to grant title to Metro West 
because genuine issues of material fact exist as to Metro West's claim of title to Parcel G. 
The court found it "undisputed" that Metro West first recorded its deed to Parcel G in Utah 
County, and was a subsequent good faith purchaser for value and, therefore, granted 
summary judgment that Metro West was the "rightful owner" of Parcel G. However, the quit 
claim deed by Metro West purportedly took title was subject to material fact issues because 
its grantor had received no prior conveyance in the chain of record title. Recordation merely 
gives constructive notice of a claim of interest, and protects subsequent good faith purchasers 
as against third party claims. Recordation does not cure an otherwise defective title. The 
evidence before the trial court raised genuine issues of material fact as to the relative validity 
of the underlying claims of title asserted by Metro West and the County, which should have 
precluded summary judgment. 
Second, even if it had properly applied the Recording Act, the trial court erred in 
granting summary judgment because numerous genuine issues of material fact were 
presented as to Metro West's status as a subsequent good faith purchaser, and whether it was 
placed on "inquiry notice." Applying the "reasonably prudent purchaser" standard, the facts 
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before the trial court raised genuine issues of material fact as to whether Metro West knew, 
or reasonably should have known, of (a) the defect in its grantor's title, and (b) of the 
County's competing interest, and was thus placed on "inquiry notice." Such fact issues also 
preclude summary judgment in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Misapplied Utah's Recording Statute 
Because Genuine Issues of Material Fact Exist as to Metro 
West's Claim of Title 
The trial court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment, effectively vesting 
title to Parcel in the Defendants: 
[Bjased on the undisputed facts that Defendant purchased the property at issue, 
'Parcel G,' for valuable consideration and in good faith, and recorded its deed 
in Utah County prior to any recording there by Plaintiff. The entirety of Parcel 
G is located in Utah County. When Plaintiff initially recorded its deed, it did 
so in Salt Lake County, which gave no notice to Defendants' predecessor in 
interest. Therefore based upon Utah Code. Ann. Section 57-3-103 and the 
undisputed facts set forth above, Defendants are the rightful owners of Parcel 
G and the Motion is granted. 
Order, Feb. 26,2001 [R. 296-297 (see Add. "A")]. Hence, the trial court decided this case 
based exclusively upon its application of Utah's Recording Act 3(the "Act"), and did not 
address the other grounds upon which Defendants sought summary judgment. The County 
believes the trial court either misconstrued or misapplied the Act. Utah's recording statute, 
which is substantially similar to that of many states, provides: 
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void against any 
3UTAH CODE ANN., Sec. 57-3-1-101, e/. seq. 
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subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if: 
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith 
and for a valuable consideration; and 
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded. 
UTAH CODE ANN., Sec. 57-3-1 -103. The Act also requires that transfers of real property must 
be "recorded in the office of the recorder of the county where the property is located," id., 
Sec. 57-3-101(1), and that such recordings "impart notice to all persons of their content, id., 
Sec. 57-3-102(1). In order to understand why the trial court misapplied the Act, it is 
necessary to review in summary the purpose of recording statutes generally. 
Recordation of a real estate conveyance instrument merely imparts notice to 
subsequent third party purchaser of a prior conveyance.4 Recordation does not convey title 
or cure defects in titles, and is not required to make effective a land transfer as between the 
parties thereto.5 Utah's provision governing unrecorded instruments6 is a typical "race-
notice" statutory recordation scheme, whereby a protected subsequent purchaser must have 
taken his conveyance in good faith, for value, and without notice of the prior purchaser's 
interest. Utah Farm Production Credit Ass'n v. Wasatch Bank of Pleasant Grove. 734 P.2d 
904, 906 [n. 2] (Utahl986). 
Shortly after the enactment of New York's recording statute (one of the nation's 
4See WILLIAM E. BURBY, REAL PROPERTY § 130 (3d ed. 1965); RUFFORD G. PATTON & 
CARROLL G. PATTON, PATTON ON TITLES §6 (2d ed. 1957&Supp. 2000) 
5UTAH CODE ANN., Sec. 57-3-102(3). 
6UTAH CODE ANN., Sec. 57-3-103. 
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earlier ones), that state's highest court explained that its purpose was to "... provide a new 
system of land registration whereby persons can ascertain by an inspection of the register, 
in whom the title to a particular piece of property is vested.... The object and purpose of the 
law is to register good titles, not to cure bad ones." Partenfelder v. People, 105 N.E. 675,676 
(N.Y. 1914)(emphasis added)7. In Utah, the condition or quality of title is not established 
by recordation. Nor does recordation per se convey title, create a marketable interest where 
none theretofore existed, or cure a title defect. The recording statute's purpose is not to make 
the transfer of property effective as between the parties {i.e., to transfer "good title"), but to 
protect a subsequent purchaser's interest against intervening claims. S.M. Horman v. Clark, 
744 P.2d 1014, 1016 (Ut. Ct. App. 1987). Rather, "good title" is generally established by 
some "record indicia" that the grantor had a valid interest in the property at the time of 
conveyance {i.e., by "chain of title"). Roberts v. Tuttle. 105 P. 916 (Utah 1909) (the terms 
'good title' and 'marketable title' refer to the record title, or chain of title, as shown by the 
public records). But, as explained below, such "record indicia" of Metro West's grantor's 
interest is entirely absent in this case. Thus, the recording statute, erroneously applied by the 
trial court here, does nothing to secure Metro West's title to Parcel G. 
7
 See also Sonderman v. Remington Const. Co., Inc., 127 N.J. 96, 115, 603 A.2d 
1, 10-11 (N.J. 1992)(Stein, J., concurring.)("A recorded deed, for example, may be a 
forgery, procured by fraud in the execution, executed by a minor, or never delivered. Any 
one of these defects will make the deed void, and the fact that it is recorded in no sense 
enhances its validity," quoting Roger A. Cunningham, William B. Stoebuck, & Dale A. 
Whitman, THE LAW OF PROPERTY, § 11.9 at 782 (1984)). 
-Page 10 of 22-
A classic hornbook illustration of a typical race-notice recording statute is as follows: 
• A holds good title to Blackacre 
• A conveys Blackacre to B. 
• A subsequently conveys Blackacre to C. C takes as a 
good faith purchaser for value, without notice of B's 
interest. 
• C records his deed. 
• B subsequently records his deed. 
• RESULT: C's interest is protected by the statute as against a 
competing claim by B because C recorded first.8 
However, if C had taken Blackacre from X, and there was no record of a prior valid 
conveyance to X supporting X's claim of title, the validity of C's title is not affirmed by the 
mere act of recordation. Being the first grantee to record a defective deed does not eliminate 
the defect. The protection given a subsequent good faith purchaser for value by the Act is 
only as good as is his underlying claim of title. That claim must be supported by evidence, 
drawn from the record chain of title, that a purchaser's grantor actually had a lawful interest 
in the property being conveyed. 
The final example above {i.e., X purportedly conveys title with no prior recorded 
conveyance to X) is precisely the scenario presented by the instant case. Here, Metro West's 
claim of title (through its predecessor, Lamona Farms) is only as strong as that of the 
Tingeys. But there is no chain-of-title evidence here of any prior conveyance of any kind to 
8WILLIAM E. BURBY, REAL PROPERTY, supra, §130 (p. 324); see also, Restatement 
(Second) of Property § 20.4 (1986). 
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the Tingeys supporting their claim of title. As Paul Richards, principal of both Metro West 
and its predecessor Lamona Farms, testified on deposition, Defendants relied solely upon the 
"word" of the Tingeys that the property had "been in the Tingey family from the turn of the 
century." [R. 218,11. 12-22]. Paul Richards claims to have relied upon a review of Utah 
County property records by his former partner, David Nelson, to satisfy himself that the 
Tingeys' title was sound [R. 217-18, 11. 18-11]. But, as discussed in greater detail in 
Argument II, infra, Metro West mysteriously chose not to obtain title insurance, a 
professional title examination, or legal advice to confirm its good title. It also failed to 
obtain, or even request, when it purportedly acquired Parcel G (nor has it produced since then 
in this litigation), any documentary evidence supporting the Tingeys' claim of title, which 
is the very foundation of Metro West's present assertion of title. 
While it is theoretically possible that the Tingeys had sound title by virtue of either 
a prior unrecorded instrument, or by a non-recordable or undocumented transfer of interest 
(such as by adverse possession), all that is certain from the trial record is that there is no 
conveyance of Parcel G to the Tingeys in the record title history. But, if indeed the Tingeys 
acquired title to Parcel G by some act outside the record, this is a factual matter to established 
by proof.9 The validity of the Tingeys' title, upon which Metro West's claim here is 
grounded, necessarily involves genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment. 
9For instance, by way of competent evidence of a prior unrecorded conveyance 
which was properly executed and delivered, or of facts establishing the elements of 
adverse possession. 
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In actuality, the only chain-of-title record evidence that was presented to the trial court 
concerning Parcel G ran contrary to the claims of the Tingeys and Metro West. In the 
County's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
affidavit of Lammert Veenstra [R. 197-2000], a professional title examiner for a major title 
insurance company, averred that: 
I have researched the records of the Utah County Recorder on 
the subject property and, based upon that research, I found no 
recorded documents that purport to convey interest in the subject 
property to Dahrl L. and Roena Tingey. 
[R. 198, \ 7]. Thus, Metro West furnished the trial court with no evidence in support of its 
claim of title, and was allowed to dodge the fundamental issue of the integrity of its 
underlying title. Metro West (through its predecessor in interest, Lamona Farms) simply 
accepted a quit claim deed from a grantor without any title-record evidence establishing that 
its grantor ever held a valid record interest in the property. The protections of the recording 
statute were never meant to extend to such claims of interest. The trial court here effectively 
quieted title in Metro West by judicial fiat without ever requiring Metro West to defend the 
underlying integrity of its claim. Metro West never established its title through evidence of 
its chain of title. Such evidence would have demonstrated that Metro West's grantor, the 
Tingeys, had no marketable record title to convey, and thus their quit claim deed may well 
have been worthless. In any event, the relative validity of Metro West's claim of title, and 
that of the County, is a question of fact. 
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It was error for the trial court to hold that Metro West is the "rightful owner" to Parcel 
G as a matter of law by operation of the Recording Act. The evidence before the trial court 
raised genuine issues as to the soundness of Metro West's underlying claim of title, and it 
would be manifestly unjust to permit a claimant to secure title through a worthless deed taken 
with deliberate disregard to obvious title flaws, as against a competing claim based upon a 
valid but unrecorded conveyance, merely because he happened to be the first to record his 
deed. Such a result was never the intent of the recording statutes, yet it is exactly the result 
that Metro West obtained in this case. 
II. The Trial Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment Because Numerous 
Genuine Issues of Material Fact were Presented as to Metro West's Status as 
a Subsequent Good Faith Purchaser, and Whether it was Placed on "Inquiry 
Notice" 
Even if, arguendo, the Recording Act had been otherwise properly applied here, it was 
error to grant summary judgment because numerous genuine issues of material fact were 
presented to the trial court regarding Metro West's status as a good faith purchaser for value. 
In order for a subsequent purchaser of property to be protected under the recording statute, 
he must purchase the property in good faith for valuable consideration and he must be 
without notice of a prior competing interest or claim. UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-3-103 (2000).10 
There are two types of constructive notice in Utah that preclude a subsequent purchaser from 
10
 Though the "without notice" requirement is not found in the express language of 
the Utah Act, it appears to be an implied part of the "good faith"requirement. See, e.g., 
Johnson v. Higlev. 1999 UT App 278,124, 989 P2d 61, 69(Ut. Ct. App. 1999); BURBY, 
supra, §134 (3d ed. 1965); 66 AM JUR 2d, Records and Recording Laws, §163. 
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protection under the recording statute. The first is record notice, which precludes a claim 
by a subsequent purchaser when, under the recording statute, the first claimant properly 
recorded his deed before the subsequent purchaser. 
The second type of constructive notice which will preclude a subsequent purchaser 
is "inquiry notice." In 1955 the Utah Supreme Court in Salt Lake, Garfield & Western 
Railway Co. v. Allied Materials Co., 291 P.2d 883 (Utah 1955), articulated the standard by 
which a subsequent purchaser under the recording statute is deemed to be placed on inquiry 
notice. The court explained: 
'Means of knowledge and knowledge itself, are in legal effect, the same thing 
where there is enough to put a party on inquiry. Knowledge which one has or 
ought to have under the circumstances is imputed to him. When a party has 
information or knowledge of certain extraneous facts which of themselves do 
not amount to, or tend to show, an actual notice, but which are sufficient to put 
a reasonably prudent man upon an inquiry respecting a conflicting interest, 
claim, or right and the circumstances are such that the inquiry if made and 
followed up with reasonable care and diligence, would lead to the discovery 
of the truth, to a knowledge of the interest, claim, or right which really exists, 
then the party is absolutely charged with a constructive notice of such interest, 
claim or right. In other words, whatever fairly puts a person on inquiry is 
sufficient notice the means of knowledge are at hand; and if he omits to 
inquire, he is then chargeable with all the fact which, by a proper inquiry he 
might have ascertained.' 
Id., 291 P.2d at 885 (quoting 39 AM JUR § 12, pp. 238-40). Recently, the Utah Supreme 
Court in First. Am. Title Ins. Co. v. J.B. Ranch. 966 P.2d 834 (Utah 1998) reaffirmed 
Utah's recognition of inquiry notice, and stated that "inquiry notice 'occur[s] when 
circumstances arise that should put a reasonable person on guard so as to require further 
inquiry on his part.'" Id., at 839 (citations omitted). "'Whatever is notice enough to excite 
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attention and put the party on his guard and call for inquiry is notice of everything to which 
such inquiry might have led. When a person has sufficient information to lead him to a fact, 
he shall be deemed conversant of it.'" Id. (citations omitted). Further, in 1987 the Utah 
Supreme Court in Diversified Equities, Inc.v. American Savings and Loan Ass'n.739 P.2d 
1133, 1139 (Utah 1987), held that "whether a party should be charged with . . . inquiry 
notice, turns on a question of fact'' (Emphasis added). Such a question of fact was presented 
to the trial court in this case. 
In many jurisdictions throughout the United States, inquiry notice may arise from facts 
a purchaser is made aware of, or should be aware of, upon receiving a title report or 
performing a title search on property.11 In this case, the County presented evidence to the 
11
 See, e.g., Richart v. Jackson. 758 A.2d 319, 322 (Vt. 2000) (a diligent inquiry 
would have readily revealed the existence of a homeowners association declaration, 
which was discovered and disclosed in defendants' own title insurance report); Osterman 
v. Baber. 714 N.E.2d 735,738-739 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (a failure to inquire further into a 
notice on the bottom of the title insurance report and to do a title search precluded 
purchaser from being bonafide); Rafferty v. District of Columbia Zoning Com'n, 662 
A.2d 191, 193 (D.C. 1995) (a PUD covenant, as well as the information purchases 
received from their title search on the property, constitute facts or circumstances 
reasonably sufficient to put a person . . . upon inquiry notice which, if pursued with 
proper diligence, would lead to the discovery of the actual condition of the title); Iwai v. 
State, 884 P.2d 936, 939 fn5 (Wash. Ct, App. 1994) (if a title search had bee made, it 
would have shown the State as the owner of the property; that information was sufficient 
to put plaintiff on notice she was proceeding against the wrong entity); In re Barnacle, 
623 A.2d 445, 450 (R.I. 1993) (record was sufficient to put title searchers on inquiry 
notice of mortgagee's interest); Simplot v. William C. Owens, M.D., P.A., 805 P.2d 477, 
480 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990) (the description of a lienholder on a certificate of title was 
sufficient to place on inquiry notice anyone who saw the certificate or who obtained a title 
search). 
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trial court through the affidavit of an expert title examiner, Lammert Veenstra, who found 
by a proper examination of the chain of title through the Utah County recorder facts which 
would have, through reasonable inquiry, put Metro West on notice of the Tingeys' lack of 
marketable title. See Aff. Veenstra [R. 197499], <H 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, and 14. Veenstra, 
in finding no record patent to Government Lot 4, turned to BLM records in Salt Lake City 
which disclosed the U.S. government patent to William Turner, from whom Salt Lake 
County took its warranty deed to Parcel G (/d.[R.198], \9), and by also researching the title 
through the Salt Lake County Recorder, he found Turner's deed to Salt Lake County. Thus, 
his search led to discovery of the County's title, even though not recorded in Utah County. 
Veenstra added that a prior copy of the Utah County ownership plat for Parcel G 
contained a recorder's notation, "IN" ("Important Notice"), intended to flag significant issues 
regarding title [R. 199, \ 12]. Veenstra stated that a proper title examination would lead the 
examiner to conclude that Salt Lake County had the strongest claim to title for the property 
in question, id., f 15, and that because of the title issues arising from the Tingeys' 
conveyance, a title insurer would not insure their grantee's title. [R. 199-200, fl6]. It is 
reasonable to infer from these facts that Metro West and Lamona Farms, when Parcel G was 
purportedly conveyed by the Tingeys, were (or should have been) alerted to the existence of 
significant title issues which they could have resolved through a title search of sufficient 
depth as to conform to the standards of the title insurance industry. 
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But according to the trial court record, Metro West did not cause a professional title 
search to be performed, did not obtain title insurance, and did not seek legal counsel in 
purchasing Parcel G. Instead, its principal, Paul Richards, merely relied on a review of 
dubious depth and accuracy made by himself and his now deceased partner (they supposedly 
"checked with the county"(Depo. Paul Richards [R. 216-217], 11. 21-5)), even after having 
been told by the Tingeys of a discrepancy in the legal description which allegedly prevented 
the Tingeys from conveying by warranty deed [id., R. 216,11. 9-20]. In short, a reasonably 
competent and diligent title examination, such as that performed by a professional title 
insurer or title attorney, would have revealed the facts that (a) the Tingeys had no claim to 
Parcel G by a prior recorded conveyance to them and thus lacked insurable title, (b) the Utah 
County Recorder had flagged the Parcel G ownership plat as having one or more title issues, 
and (c) constructive notice of the claim of title by Salt Lake County existed in property 
records outside Utah County (i.e., the BLM). Aff. Veenstra, [R. 197-200], supra. Applying 
the "reasonably prudent purchaser" standard, these facts are exactly the kind of "red flags" 
that ought to excite the attention of a person of reasonable diligence to the potential existence 
of outstanding title issues, and were more than sufficient to place Metro West on inquiry 
notice of a competing claim and/or defect in their purported title. 
Metro West presented no evidence to the trial court suggesting any meaningful effort 
on its part to secure a thorough title search or other reliable assurance of title (such as title 
insurance or legal assistance). Depo. of Paul Richards [R. 215], 11. 13-16. In fact, 
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Appellees did nothing to confirm their prospective title other than to rely on the Tingeys' 
"word" assuring their good title to Parcel G. Metro West took its title via quitclaim deed, 
even where the grantors' stated rationale for refusing to warrant their title was a discrepancy 
in the property's legal description. Being informed of such a discrepancy and the seller's 
refusal to warrant his title - even without the other suggestions of title flaws in the official 
records - should reasonably have placed a purchaser on notice that further inquiry regarding 
the strength of the Tingeys' title was called for. A purchaser should not, as happened here, 
be permitted to hide behind the recording statute after having deliberately turned a blind eye 
to obvious indicia of title defects or competing claims. Pender v. Bird, 224 P.2d 1057,1059 
(Utah 1950) ("the [recording] statute was not enacted to protect one whose ignorance of the 
title is deliberate and intentional"). 
The evidence presented below raised substantial questions of fact regarding the 
adequacy of Metro West's investigation of title. If Metro West had conducted a meaningful 
and reasonable title investigation, it would have discovered such glaring irregularities that 
the Tingeys' purported title would have been uninsurable. Aff. Veenstra, [R. 199-200], 
supra, f 16. Hence, there were clearly genuine issues of material fact raised below as to (a) 
whether Metro West was placed on inquiry notice by the facts and circumstances surrounding 
its purported acquisition of Parcel G, and (b) whether it satisfied its duty of diligent inquiry 
under the "reasonably prudent purchaser" standard in resolving questions concerning the 
soundness of its prospective title, and the existence of a competing title claim by the County. 
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CONCLUSION 
In granting summary judgment to Metro West, the trial court failed to recognize 
multiple genuine issues of material fact with respect to (1) the validity of Metro West's claim 
of title to Parcel G, and (2) Metro West's status as a subsequent good faith purchaser (i.e., 
whether it had "inquiry notice"). Accordingly, the summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants should be reversed and the case be remanded for trial. 
DAVID E. YOCUM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
By: 
DON^ 
Deputy District Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two (2) true and complete copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT was: 
/( Mailed by U.S. First Class Mail, postage prepaid 
to: 
MARKF. JAMES, ESQ. 
MARK R. CLEMENTS, ESQ. 
Hatch & James 
10 West Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City UT 84101 
On this 
Attorneys for Defendants 
day of. Od ., 200_ 
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ADDENDUM 
CONSISTING OF 
Exhibit "A" Order (Honorable Sandra Peuler), February 26, 2001 
Exhibit "B" UTAHCODE ANN. Sections 57-3-101; 57-3-102(1); 57-3-
103 (recording act). 
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MAR 0 8 2ant f h , r d jUd':ciaJ District 8 2001 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
LITIGATION Y 
FEB 2 5 2001 
SALT 
ORDER 
Civil No. 990901915 DC 
Judge Sandra Peuler 
MARK F.JAMES (5295) 
MARKR. CLEMENTS (7172) 
HATCH, JAMES & DODGE 
10 West Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-6363 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
$ $ 3|c c^ $ $ ifc 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body corporate 
and politic of the State of Utah, 
Plaintiff, 
Vs. 
METRO WEST READY MLX, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, and MONTERRA ROCK 
PRODUCTS, INC., a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants. 
Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court, having heard 
argument of counsel and having further reviewed the pleadings on file in this matter and good cause 
appearing therefore, 
HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment is granted. The Court's Order is based upon undisputed facts that Defendant purchased the 
property at issue, "Parcel G", for valuable consideration and in good faith, and recorded its deed in 
Utah County prior to any recording there by Plaintiff. The entirety of Parcel G is located in Utah 
County. When Plaintiff initially recorded its deed, it did so in Salt Lake County, which gave no 
•PXHIRIT n 
PAGE L OJGL 
notice to Defendants' predecessors in interest. Therefore, based'upon Utah Code Ann. Section 57-3-
103 and the undisputed facts set forth above, Defendants' are the rightful owners of Parcel G and 
their Motion is granted. 
DATED this e c day of February, 2001. 
/ 1 s • -
'' *^: fa 
v-4/<^ 
)GE SANDRA PEU&£R 
Third District Judge ' \ r ; 
• W 
A<2 
Approved as to Form: 
P. Soltis-




RECORDING OF DOCUMENTS 
ction 
-3-1 to 57-3-12. Renumbered as §§ 57-3-101 to 57-3-107. 
P a r t i 
General Provisions 
'-3-101. Certificate of acknowledgment, proof of execu-
tion, jurat, or other certificate required — 
Notarial acts affecting real property. 
r
-3-102. Record imparts notice — Change in interest rate 
— Validity of document — Notice of unnamed 
interests — Conveyance by grantee. 
T-3-103. Effect of failure to record. 
f-3-104. Certified copies entitled to record in another 
county — Effect. 
7-3-105. Legal description of real property and names and 
addresses required in documents. 
7-3-106. Original documents required — Captions — Leg-
ibility [Effective until July 1, 20021. 
Original documents required — Captions — Leg-
ibility [Effective July 1, 2002]. 
7-3-107. Unenforceable covenants — Definition — Inclu-
sion in recorded document. 
7-3-108. Financing statements not subject to title. 
Part 2 
Master Mortgage and Trust Deeds 
»7-3-201. Definitions. 
17-3-202. Recording master mortgage and trust deed — 
Requirements for master form — Indexing by 
county recorder. 
>7-3-203. Authorization to incorporate master form by ref-
erence — Referencing a master form — Pro-
hibiting the reference of legal descriptions. 
>7-3-204. Constructive notice — Effect as between direct 
parties to mortgage or trust deed. 




57-3-101. Certificate of acknowledgment, proof of ex-
ecution, jurat, or other certificate required — 
Notarial acts affecting real property. 
(1) A certificate of the acknowledgment of any document, or 
of the proof of the execution of any document, or a jurat as 
defined in Section 46-1-2, or other notarial certificate contain-
ing the words "subscribed and sworn" or their substantial 
equivalent, that is signed and certified by the officer taking the 
acknowledgment, proof, or jurat, as provided in this title, 
entitles the document and the certificate to be recorded in the 
office of the recorder of the county where the real property is 
located. 
(2) Notarial acts affecting real property in this state shall 
also be performed in conformance with Title 46, Chapter 1. 
1998 
57-3-102. Record imparts notice — Change in interest 
rate — Validity of document — Notice of un-
named interests — Conveyance by grantee. 
(1) Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified, 
in the manner prescribed by this title, each original document 
or certified copy of a document complying witn section o/-
4a-3, whether or not acknowledged, each copy of a notice of 
location complying with Section 40-1-4, and each financing 
statement complying with Section 70A-9a-502, whether or not 
acknowledged shall, from the time of recording with the 
appropriate county recorder, impart notice to all persons of 
their contents. 
(2) If a recorded document was given as security, a change 
in the interest rate in accordance with the terms of an 
agreement pertaining to the underlying secured obligation 
does not affect the notice or alter the priority of the document 
provided under Subsection (1). 
(3) This section does not affect the validity of a document 
with respect to the parties to the document and all other 
persons who have notice of the document. 
(4) The fact that a recorded document recites only a nomi-
nal consideration, names the grantee as trustee, or otherwise 
purports to be in trust without naming beneficiaries or stating 
the terms of the trust does not charge any third person with 
notice of any interest of the grantor or of the interest of any 
other person not named in the document. 
(5) The grantee in a recorded document may convey the 
interest granted to him free and clear of all claims not 
disclosed in the document in which he appears as grantee or in 
any other document recorded in accordance with this title that 
sets forth the names of the beneficiaries, specifies the interest 
claimed, and describes the real property subject to the inter-
est. 2000 
57-3-103. Effect of failure to record. 
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void 
as against any subsequent purchaser of the same real prop-
erty, or any portion of it, if: 
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property 
in good faith and for a valuable consideration; and 
(2) the subsequent purchaser 's document is first duly 
recorded. 1998 
57-3-104. Certified copies entitled to record in another 
county — Effect. 
Whenever a document is of record in the office of the county 
recorder of any county, a copy of the record of the document 
certified by the county recorder may be recorded in the office of 
the county recorder of any other county. The recording of a 
certified copy in the office of the county recorder of another 
county has the same force and effect as if the original docu-
ment had been recorded in the other county. 1998 
57-3-105. Legal description of real property and names 
and addresses required in documents. 
(1) A document executed after July 1, 1983, is entitled to be 
recorded in the office of any county recorder only if the 
document contains a legal description of the real property 
affected. 
(2) (a) A document affecting title to real property presented 
for recording after July 1, 1981, is entitled to be recorded 
in the office of any county recorder only if the document 
contains the names and mailing addresses of the grantees 
in addition to the legal description required under Sub-
section (1). 
(b) The address of the management committee may be 
used as the mailing address of a grantee as required in 
Subsection (2)(a) if the interest conveyed is a timeshare 
interest as defined by Section 57-19-2. 
(3) Each county recorder shall refuse to accept a document 
for recording if it does not conform to the requirements under 
this section. 
(4) Notwithstanding Subsections (1), (2), and (3), a master 
form, as defined in Section 57-3-201, that does not meet the 
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